

PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 9 MAY 1983

EDITORIALS

WASHINGTON POST 8 May 1983 (9)

A Diplomatic Success—Maybe

SECRETARY OF STATE Shultz has brought the Reagan administration its biggest diplomatic success—maybe. As a result of his debut on the Mideast shuttle, Lebanon has accepted without condition and Israel has accepted “in principle” the terms—still secret—on which Israel is to withdraw the troops it sent into Lebanon 11 months ago. The “additional clarifications” Israel seeks “will not pose any real problems,” Mr. Shultz says.

Both the Lebanese and Israeli governments deserve respect for moving toward agreement. Lebanon had to maneuver between Israel’s difficult demands and the knowledge that excessive compromise on either security or political arrangements would leave it fatally vulnerable to both internal strains and external Arab pressures. Israel needed to balance the temptation to consolidate on its own a long-term position in southern Lebanon and the risk of an agreement with a government so frail it might not be able to enforce it. That Mr. Shultz could bring the two to the verge of a signing had to take formidable bargaining prowess.

From Israel, Mr. Shultz flew to Jordan. In saying earlier that he would not join the peace talks with Israel sought by the Reagan administration, King Hussein had cited, as he put it, the American failure to move Israel out of Lebanon. It is fair to ask just what part of Israel’s movement in Lebanon springs from American prodding and what part comes from

its own determination to make the most of a rare negotiating opportunity. But whatever the answer, the obvious hope now is that progress toward a Lebanon agreement will lead the king to review the bidding. Mr. Shultz left Amman saying the king regards the new development as a “significant step.”

In Damascus, his mission was to persuade a bristling Syria to accept the agreement between Lebanon and Israel, and to remove from Lebanon its 30,000 troops and the PLO forces it also controls. It is accepted all around that Israel’s and Syria’s withdrawals depend on one another. The question is whether Syria, its defenses restored by Moscow, will raise the ante and demand not merely Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on Syrian terms, but American commitments on the Palestinian question and on eventual Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights as well.

Secretary Shultz made the case for putting Lebanon first. To no one’s surprise, President Assad showed he will not come around easily. Mr. Shultz’s strong card remains Syria’s awareness that only America’s influence on Israel can bring Damascus its goals. He will need all the help he can get from the Arab moderates, uncertain as they are—he is in Saudi Arabia today. In any event, in this stage at least, Israel, unless it makes a federal case out of those “clarifications,” is home free. If there is a breakdown, the blame will be Syria’s.

The problem isn’t leaks; it’s government secrecy

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
7 May 1983 (9)

The extraordinary actions that the Reagan administration has taken to shut off the flow of information to the American people are directly at odds with the proposition that an informed public is essential to a healthy democratic society.

Is it really true that—as a presidential committee declared in calling for stringent curbs (including criminal penalties) on the disclosure of classified information—“unauthorized disclosure of classified information has become an increasingly commonplace occurrence”? And if it is true, have

those disclosures “endangered” the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, as President Reagan insists?

Two House subcommittees in joint hearings recently questioned the director of the government’s Information Security Oversight Office, to which all “knowing and willful” leaks are supposed to be reported. How many unauthorized leaks? In the last three years, Director Stephen Garfinkel estimated, about “half a dozen.”

How’s that again? About “half a dozen”? That is not very many. Where did they come from? “Most of them

came from military agencies,” said Mr. Garfinkel, ISOO director since May 1980. “Some ended up being reported in the press. Some didn’t.”

The committees also heard from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard K. Willard, chairman of the panel convened at the request of the president’s national security adviser, William P. Clark. According to Mr. Willard, the panel of senior officials did not make a special study of information leaks before coming out with

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NEW YORK TIMES 8 May 1983 (9)

The Hole in Andropov's Space-Weapons Treaty

To the Editor:

I noted with interest your recent news article [April 28] about Yuri V. Andropov's letter to a group of American space and military specialists who favor banning a race in space weaponry. I believe it is important to take a critical look at what the Soviet leader has offered.

Mr. Andropov states that he wishes to ban space-based weapons, and he notes that the Soviets have offered a draft treaty on this subject to the United Nations. He places blame for the failure to ban space armaments on the resistance of the U.S. and other members of NATO.


Unfortunately, the statement is a distortion of the facts, and Mr. Andropov's well-publicized letter seems designed to gain propaganda points rather than to grapple with the serious problems posed by space weaponry.

The statement and the draft treaty that it touts are documents of convenience: the treaty has a loophole large enough to fire the Soviet anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon through.

Mr. Andropov makes no mention of Moscow's current ASAT, which has been in operation for 15 years and which the Soviets continue to test. Last June, for instance, this weapon was tested together with land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, Soviet ABM capabilities and an SS-20 rocket.

Some observers have interpreted

this test as indicating that the Soviets view ASAT's as an important element in fighting a nuclear war. Mr. Andropov's treaty would allow the Soviet Union to retain this deadly system



since it is deployed on the ground. The treaty only applies to space-based weapons.

Moreover, the treaty implicitly speaks of the right to interfere with certain space systems. Some believe that this provision could be used to justify attacks on any space systems which the Soviets unilaterally declare to be hostile.

They have already targeted their

propaganda on the U.S. space shuttle. Would the treaty allow them to target it with their ASAT? Also, concern has been expressed that the Soviets would use this provision to justify interference with direct-broadcast satellites if the broadcasts that utilize them fail to echo Moscow's line.

The Soviet treaty and the Andropov letter try to make political points with the U.S. and world opinion instead of dealing with the very serious challenge posed by an arms race in space. This is an important subject for immediate negotiation — a view I have expressed repeatedly in hearings that I have chaired and at the Adelman confirmation hearing. But until the Soviets forsake their current desire for unilateral coverage, there is little prospect for agreement.

A serious accord must deal with the Soviet ASAT, for which the U.S. currently has no equivalent. It would require stringent verification, which is not adequately addressed in the Soviet draft accord.

I believe that Senate Resolution 48, which I and eight co-sponsors have offered, presents an approach that is more likely to prevent a space arms race since it deals with these important considerations.

(Senator) LARRY PRESSLER
Washington, May 2, 1983

The writer is chairman of the Senate Arms Control Subcommittee.

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the report upon which Mr. Reagan's March 11 directive was based.

He also testified, in startling contradiction to the panel's assertion, "We have never suggested that it's a problem that has increased greatly in severity in recent years," adding: "It's always been a problem."

That last sentence is true. Unauthorized leaks have been a problem since President George Washington blew a gasket in 1795 over a Virginia senator's disclosure of the secret text of Jay's Treaty with Britain to the Philadelphia Aurora, as historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted recently in the Wall Street Journal.

The Reagan administration, however, is the first — in war or peace — to

call for such stringent secrecy measures. One of the measures in Mr. Reagan's March 11 directive would require all government employees with access to classified intelligence information to sign agreements promising to submit to censors before publication any articles or books they write after leaving federal service. That "might spare us some memoirs of presidential aides," Sen. Patrick Moynihan (D., N.Y.) observed, but it would hobble people who can and do contribute much to public debate after leaving office. The directive also would require government employees to take polygraph tests in probes of information leaks with "adverse consequences" for refusal to cooperate.

Defending his directive, President

Reagan declared that "all we have proposed is methods of intercepting the leaks from government itself to the press." That's not all, by a long shot.

What he really has proposed is that the American people accept the infallibility of those who temporarily occupy the seats of power; that they accept without question the information spoon-fed to them by their government; that they accept that their officials, from the president on down, will never do what officials have always done — stamp secrecy classifications on information that might be embarrassing, that might reveal incompetence, corruption and even crimes.

None of that is acceptable to a free people who mean to stay free.